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THE DEMISE OF THE
DISCRIMINATORY EFFECT ANALYSIS-
NASHVILLE GAS CO. V. SATTY
Employment practices relating to pregnancy have given rise to
court challenges on a major scale,' in part because of the influx of
women in the workforce. 2  The most recent United States Supreme
Court decision in this area is Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty,3 in which
the Court considered whether denial of sick leave pay and seniority
rights to female employees returning from pregnancy leave violated
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 4  After the respondent filed
1. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Lafleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (mandatory maternity leave
policies violate the Due Process Clause); Buckley v. Coyle Pub. Sch. Sys., 476 F.2d 92, 96
(10th Cir. 1973) (school system must show compelling state interest to require mandatory
maternity leave); Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629, 636-37 (2d Cir. 1973) (man-
datory maternity leave policy was an arbitrary and discriminatory policy); See also Holthaus v.
Compton & Sons, Inc., 514 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1975) (employer must prove a business necessity
before terminating a pregnant employee); MacLennan v. American Airlines, Inc., 440 F.Supp..
466 (E.D.Va. 1977) (mandatory maternity leave policy was not justified by proof of business
necessity).
In Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44 (1975) (per curiam), a Utah
statute denied pregnant women unemployment compensation benefits twelve weeks before and
six weeks after childbirth. The Court stated that the statute presented an irrebutable presump-
tion that pregnant women were unable to work before and after delivery of their child and thus
violated the Due Process Clause. Id. at 46.
See also Jacobs v. Martin Sweets Co., 550 F.2d 364 (6th Cir. 1977). In Jacobs, an unwed
pregnant employee was given two weeks notice of termination by her employer after he had
been told of her pregnancy. After she filed a complaint with the EEOC, the employer changed
her work assignment, which in effect acted as a constructive termination. The Court found this
action a clear violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 371. See General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Gilbert]. For a discussion of
this case, see notes 38-50 and accompanying text infra. See also Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Geduldig]. This decision is discussed at notes 19-25 and accompany-
ing text infra.
2. In the United States today, forty-six percent of all women over the age of sixteen are
employed. S. 995, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 4143 (1977). The latest statistics
indicate that thirty-nine million women are working or seeking work. Id. Twenty-five million are
employed because of a basic need to supplement their husband's income or because they are
divorced, single or widowed. During the past fifty years, an increasing number of women have
entered the work force. In 1920, 22.7% of the female population was employed; by 1970, this
number had reached nearly fifty percent. Since the mid-1960's, the most rapid increase has
come from those women in the twenty to thirty-four year old group. Many of these women are
mothers of pre-school age children and at some point interrupted their career to have a child or
did not start working until the children were born. B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON, &
S. Ross,SEx DISCRIMINATION AND TiE LAW 192-93 (1975), citing Simmons, Freedman, Dinkle
& Blau, Exploitation from 9 to 5 (Background Paper for the Twentieth Century Fund Task
Force on Women and Employment) ch. 1 (1974).
3. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 98 S. Ct. 347 (1977).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)(2) (1964 & Supp. IV 1974).
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charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), she received a "right to sue" letter, a jurisdictional pre-
requisite 5 necessary to bring an action against her employer in the
federal district court.6  Thereafter, the district court held that the
company violated Title VI by denying sick leave pay to the respon-
dent while she was on pregnancy leave 7 and by not permitting her to
retain her previously accumulated seniority.8 This decision was af-
firmed by the court of appeals. 9
In an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court
considered the issues of a sick leave pay and seniority separately. The
5. If the Commissioner of the EEOC is unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation
agreement to prevent further unlawful employment practices, the EEOC most notify the ag-
grieved party within thirty days. Thereafter, a civil action may be brought against the respon-
dent in district court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1964), as aounded, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(0
(Stpp. IV 1974).
6. Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 384 F.Supp. 765 (M.D. Tenn. 1974). The employment prac-
tices at issue were a lower payment for pregnancy benefits than for other medical benefits
under the company insurance policy, the denial of sick leave pay during a mandatory maternity
leave, the refusal to hold open the plaintiff's position while she was on maternity leave and the
denial of accumulated seniority rights fbr the purpose of bidding on job openings.
The maternity leave policy came tinder close judicial scrutiny. Ms. Satty had been informed
that although the decision concerning the commencement of her maternity leave would be
based on several factors including the company doctor's opinion, Ms. Satty's duties, her work
area and the degree of public contact, the company itself would make the final decision as to
when the leave was to begin, Id. at 771-72. In this respect, maternity leave was "mandatory".
In practice, pregnant employees could not decline to accept maternity leave and retain
employment affiliation with the company. Id. at 767. However, the court found that the date of
Ms. Satty's leave was not unreasonable. Id. at 772. This issue was not raised on appeal.
7. Id. at 771. Employees at Nashville Gas earned a given number of sick days to use in the
future. The number of earned days depended upon the length of continuous employment and how
frequently the sick leave (lays were used in the past. See Amicus Curiae Brief for Respondent at 4,
n.3, Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 98 S.Ct. 347 (1977). The employer did not have a disability plan
for its employees.
8. 384 F. Supp. at 771. The company credited the employee returning from maternity leave
with accumulated seniority rights tbr the purposes of pension, vacation and other employee
benefits. However, it did not credit her with previously accumulated seniority for the purpose
of bidding on job openings. As a consequence, the respondent lost several opportunities for
permanent positions when she was preempted by those who had been employed after her. Id. at
767.
In discussing both the sick leave and the seniority issues, the court distinguished the stan-
dards to be applie 1 to those cases arising under the Equal Protection Clause and those tinder
Title VII. fd. at 770. To withstand judicial scrutiny, those claims raised inder the former need
show a reasonable basis for the discriminatory employment practice. For those cases falling
under Title VII, the employer nust show a business necessity in order to withstand the chal-
lenge. Id. Since the company offered no such proof of business necessity, the court assumed no
business justification existed. Id. at 771.
9., Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 552 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975). The court stressed that the
policy behind Title VII was to remove artificial barriers that operated to discriminatorily effect
members of a class. It also viewed the reach of Title VII as broader than that of the Equd
Protection Clause. Id. at 855.
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Court unanimously upheld the Sixth Circuit finding that the denial of
accumulated seniority to females returning from pregnancy leave vio-
lated Title VII, because the company policy acted both to deprive
these women of employment opportunities and to "adversely effect
[their] status as employees."l1 Moreover, the Court emphasized
the district court's finding that the employer offered no proof of busi-
ness necessity to justify its discriminatory actions.' 1
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the district court's ruling
of the issue on sick leave pay to pregnant employees.' 2  After finding
that exclusion of this benefit from a sick leave plan had no direct
effect on employment opportunities per se, 13 the Court noted that the
only consequence flowing from the exclusion would be a "mere" loss
of income, an effect it deemed insufficient to prove a discriminatory
practice.' 4 Justice Rehnquist, in the decision, spoke in terms of an
equal protection analysis rather than a Title VII analysis, although the
complaint was raised solely under Title VII. 15
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the Satty decision in the
context of prior case law and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. It will
suggest that the discriminatory effect test used by the Court in previ-
ous employment discrimination and Title VII decisions has been re-
placed, at least in some circumstances, by the equal protection test of
"pretext designed to effect an invidious discrimination." In conclu-
sion, this Note will suggest alternative avenues of relief for pregnant
employees with claims of sex discrimination. '
THE HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF
NASHVILLE GAS CO. V. SATTY
The Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdic-
10. 98 S.Ct. at 351.
11. Id. at 352 n.5. The Court noted that denial of accumulated seniority for job bidding
purposes "'might easily conflict with [the company's] own economic and efficiency interests." Id.
See also note 8 supra.
12. 98 S.Ct. at 352.
13. Id.
14. However, since Ms. Satty had earned her sick days by virtue of her years of employment
with the company, she had been denied a benefit she had earned. This denial, in and of itself,
had a monetary effect and consequently a discriminatory effect on Ms. Satty and others similarly
situated. See Amicus Curiae Brief for Respondent at 4 n.3, Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 98 S. Ct. 347
(1977).
15. 98 S. Ct. at 352-53.
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tion the equal protection of the laws." 16 State action is a prerequisite
to maintaining a cause of action predicated on this amendment. 17
Hence, the violation of equal protection of the laws became an argu-
ment available to those with claims of sex discrimination as promul-
gated and enforced by state legislation.' 8
In Satty, the Supreme Court relied on its discussion of equal pro-
tection as applied to the claim of sex discrimination in Geduldig v.
Aiello 19 and as specifically discussed in the Title VII case of General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert.20  In Geduldig, the plaintiff charged that the
practice of excluding pregnancy benefits from a state disability pro-
gram constituted sex discrimination in violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. 21  While the Court declared that classifications based on
pregnancy were not sex-based classifications per se, 22 they indicated
such classifications could violate the Constitution if they served as a
"pretext designed to effect an invidious discrimination against a par-
ticularly identifiable group. " 23  However, in Geduldig no such pre-
text was found because there was insufficient evidence of discrimina-
16.U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
17. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 298-99 (1966); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721 (1961); See generally Developments In The Law-Equal Protection,
82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1069-72 (1969).
18. See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974) (classification "widow" had a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the Florida property tax exemption legislation); Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971) (Fourteenth Amendment mandates that a classification based on
sex must rest on a fair and substantial relation to the legislation); see also Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973) (statutory scheme which acted to discriminate against
females and which was predicated upon administrative efficiency violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
19. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
20. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
21. 417 U.S. at 486. California had a disability insurance program which excluded from
coverage certain disabilities resulting from pregnancy and pregnancy itself. The major issue was
whether the program invidiously discriminated against pregnant women by not paying insurance
benefits for disabilities that accompanied normal pregnancy and childbirth. Id. at 492.
22. Id. at 496 n.20.
23. Id. at 496-97, n.20. Footnote 20 is perhaps the most discussed and oft-quoted comment
from the Geduldig decision. It left the door open for claims involving pregnancy related issues
lut, simultaneously, it indicated that complainants would face a difficult task in proving sex
discrimination. For an analysis of the Court's holding, see Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello, Preg-
nancy Classifications and the Definition of Sex Discrimination, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 441 (1975);
Comment, Pregnancy and the Constitution: The Uniqueness Trap, 62 CAL. L. REv. 1532 (1974).
See generally Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional
Adjudication, 52 NEW YORK L. REv. 36 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional Adjudication];
Comment, Gender-Based Discrimination and a Developing Standard of Equal Protection Analysis,
46 U. CIN. L. REV. 572 (1977); Comment, Equal Protection Challenges to Gender-Based Classifi-
cations Evoke Varied Court Responses, 17 WAsmuN L. J. 182 (1977); Note, The Impact of
Geduldig v. Aiello on the EEOC Guidelines on Sex Discrimination, 50 INDIANA L. J. 592 (1975).
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tory intent on the part of the State when it excluded pregnancy as a
compensated disability.24
The seeking of evidence of discriminatory purpose or intent seems
to be consistent with later case law which suggests that the 'pretext'
approach in equal protection cases depends heavily upon such a
finding of discriminatory purpose or intent.2 5  Although the Court
has not obviated an analysis of the impact of an allegedly discrimina-
tory practice, it has indicated that the invidious nature of a chal-
lenged practice normally must "ultimately be traced to a . . . dis-
criminatory purpose." 26  However, it also has recognized that ascer-
taining a discriminatory purpose or intent is extremely difficult, if not
futile. 27  Given the Geduldig holding that discrimination based on preg-
nancy is not equated with discrimination based on sex and given
decisions indicating that establishment of discrimination without
establishment of a discriminatory purpose is a difficult method of
proving an equal protection violation, the Geduldig ruling presented a
formidable obstacle to respondent Satty's Title VII claim.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids employer discrim-
ination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion or national origin. 28
24. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. at 496.
25. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Arlington Heights v. M.H.D.C.]. This case challenged zoning
practices which allegedly worked a discriminatory effect against racial minorities. Id. at 254. The
Court stated that once the proof had shown that a discriminatory purpose was the motivation
behind a legislative decision, judicial deference to that decision would no longer be justified. Id.
at 265-66.
26. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 250 (1976). In Davis, the Court held that "the basic
equal protection principle [is] that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially dis-
criminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose." Id. justice White,
in his majority opinion, indicated that the demonstration of such discriminatory purpose is criti-
cal in proving an equal protection violation. Id. at 244-45. See generally, Note, Discriminatory
Purpose: What It Means Under The Equal Protection Clause-Washington v. Davis, 26 DE PAUL
L. REv. 650 (1977).
27. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971). In Palmer, a city closed swimming pools
allegedly to avoid racial integration. Justice Black, speaking for the majority, stated that ascer-
taining motivation was extremely difficult. Furthermore, to invalidate a law because of bad
motives was an almost futile endeavor. To determine whether an invidious discriminatory pur-
pose was the motivation behind the practice required judicial inquiry into circumstantial evi-
dence of intent. See also, Arlington Heights v. M.H.D.C., 429 U.S. at 266. See generally Con-
stitutional Adjudication, note 23 supra. Therein, the author suggests that the Court has failed to
develop a coherent body of law indicating when motive is or is not relevant in the judicial
determination. Id. at 113. He presents four reasons why the courts should not discuss legislative
motive when deciding a case. Id. at 115-17.
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e2-2000e(17) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
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The Act provides all these groups with a powerful weapon in the job
market by providing for injunctive relief as well as reinstatement
or hiring of the employee with or without compensation.29
Most case law clarifying Title V11 30 has involved challenges to ra-
cially discriminatory employment practices in violation of Sections
703(a)(1) and 703(a)(2) of the Civil Rights Act. Section 703(a)(1) bars
discrimination against an employee in the terms or conditions of his
or her employment. 31 Section 703(a)(2) declares that an unlawful
employment practice occurs if an employer classifies an employee in
such a way as to deprive the individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect that employee's status.3 2  It would seem
that since Title VII also prohibits discrimination based on sex, these
decisions, by analogy, should be applied with equal force to cases
alleging sex discrimination.
The landmark decision under Section 703(a)(2), Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.,3 3 illustrates the standard to be applied to challenges aris-
ing under this section. Although the complaint in Griggs specified a
violation of Section 703(a)(2), the Supreme Court declared, in most
general terms, that "Congress directed the thrust of the [Civil Rights]
Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply to the
motivation." 3 4  It likewise noted that Congress proscribed those
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Supp. IV 1974).
30. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 349 (1977) (seniority
system perpetuating effects of past racial and ethnic discrimination was a prima facie violation of
Title VII); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 436 (1975) (once employer proves
that pre-employment tests are job related, complainant must show that other tests would
better perform this function in order to present evidence that employer was using the tests as a
pretext for discrimination); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (pre-employ-
ment intelligence test was discriminatory in operation). Since classifications based on both sex
and race are prohibited under Title VII, the law as it applies to one group should apply to the
other.
31. Section 703(a)(1) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail to refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment be-
cause of such individual's race.., or sex ...
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970) (emphasis added).
32. Section 703(a)(2) declares it an unlawful employment practice fbr an employer:
to limit, segregate or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee because of such
individual's race.., or sex. ...
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
33. 401 U.S. 432 (1971). Griggs raised a Section 703(a) (2) claim when the company testing
program, neutral on its face, had a disproportionate impact on blacks in that it excluded a
significantly high number of blacks from employment opportunities. Id. at 426.
34. Id. at 432.
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practices which were fair in form but discriminatory in operation.35
In 1977, the Court reiterated the applicability of the "discriminatory
effect" standard when it stated:
the Court has repeatedly held that a prima facie Title VII violation
may be established by policies or practices that are neutral on their
face and in intent but that nonetheless discriminate in effect against
a particular group.36
The discriminatory effect analysis, however, was not limited explicitly
to Section 703(a)(2) controversies. It can be argued that because the
Court was discussing Section 703(a)(2) issues, the dicta was applicable
to only that section of Title VII.a 7  The implication, however, was
that this analysis was applicable to all Title VII controversies.
Notwithstanding the fact that most of the Title VII cases involved
racial discrimination, the Supreme Court has considered Section
703(a)(1)' in the context of alleged sex discrimination. In General Elec-
tric Co. v. Gilbert,38 the plaintiff argued that the exclusion of pregnancy
from a disability benefits plan violated Title VII. Although the
cause of action was based solely on Title VII, a plurality of the
Court 39 incorporated the concepts of the Equal Protection Clause
into the Title VII claim. 40 Given the precedent of Geduldig the
Court found the disability plan in Gilbert to be non-discriminatory.
41
By applying an equal protection analysis to a Section 703(a)(1) con-
troversy, tie plurality departed from a strict application of the dis-
35. Id. at 431.
36. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 349 (1977)), citing Gen-
eral Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 137 (1976), Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
246-47 (1976); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 422, 425 (1975), and Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Teamsters case involved a pattern and practice suit alleg-
ing discrimination against minorities in a seniority system which perpetuated the effects of past
discrimination. 431 U.S. at 328.
In Griggs, the employer offered a showing of its good intent by presenting its policy of
funding two-thirds of an employee's high school education. However, the Court indicated that
the possibility of good intentions by Duke Power did not outweigh the consequences of the
employment practice. 401 U.S. at 432. o
37. If the dicta was applicable to only Section 703(a) (2), the Court could be accused of
poorly articulating its standards since its language was directed towards all Title VII violations.
38. 429 U.S. at 127-28.
39. The fact that the opinion in Gilbert was a plurality opinion is of utmost importance when
scrutinizing the Satty decision. Five justices implicitly or explicitly recognized the continuing
viability of the discriminatory effect test. See note 48 and accompanying text infra.
40. Id. at 133, 136. The Court stated that the exclusion of pregnancy from a disability
benefits program was not gender-based discrimination. Since a finding of discrimination would
trigger a Title VII claim, and no such finding existed, the Court decided that it could legitimately
follow the analysis of Geduldig and find no pretext to effectuate invidious discrimination if no
discriminatory intent could be found. Id. at 135-36.
41. Id. at 140.
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criminatory effect standard previously used for proving Title VII vio-
lations in racial discrimination cases. 42  The thrust of the Gilbert
opinion signified that a pretext analysis was appropriate in certain
situations.4 3 However, as an alternative, the plurality noted that, in
some circumstances, the plaintiff could prove a Title VII violation by
proving a discriminatory effect. 4 4 The Court failed to explain in what
situations the pretext analysis was appropriate and in what other situ-
ations the discriminatory effect analysis was appropriate. Neverthe-
less, the Court determined that the plaintiff had failed to meet either
burden. 45
42. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247 (1976). In Davis, the Court noted that
Congress demanded more than a rational basis to uphold an employer's discriminatory practices.
Review under Title VII involves a more probing judicial review of, and less defer-
ence to, the seemingly reasonable acts of administrators... than is appropriate
under the Constitution ...
Id. The employer must show that any given requirement which has a disproportionate impact
on a protected group has a demonstrable relationship to the employment policy in question.
Griggs, 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). The proof is a showing of business necessity. Id. See generally
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e(17) (Supp. IV 1974).
Congress provided for an exception to its mandate for equal employment opportunities in the
bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) provision of Title VII See Title VII. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2 (1970). See generally Note, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 84 HAnv. L. REv. 1109, 1176-95 (1971).
43. 429 U.S. at 135-37.
44. Id. at 136-37. Justice Rehnquist, stated that "our cases recognize that aprinafacie violation
of Title VII can be established in some circumstances upon proof that the effect of an otherwise
facially neutral plan ... is to discriminate."
45. Id. at 137.
The Gilbert Court also chose to disregard the EEOC guidelines set forth concerning Title VII.
429 U.S. at 142. These guidelines prohibited discrimination in any disability or sick leave plan
because of pregnancy or related illnesses. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1975). The Court stressed
that the guidelines were not issued contemporaneously with the original Title VII legislation
enacted in 1964. Gillrt, 429 U.S. at 142. In addition, it noted that these guidelines conflicted
with earlier EEOC pronouncements and, therefore, were not to be accorded "'great deference"
during the judicial inquiry. Id. at 142-43. See generally Note, Current Trends in Pregnancy
Benefits-1972 EEOC Guidelines Interpreted, 24 DE PAUL L. Rjv. 127 (1974) (discussing validity
of EEOC guidelines). 0
However, the Court generally has allowed agencies which are faced with new developments
or in reconsideration of relevant facts to alter and perhaps overturn past administrative interpre-
tations, rulings and practices. See e.g., American Trucking Ass'ns. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.,
387 U.S. 397, 416 (1967). However, because the EEOC did not follow the appropriate proce-
dure, i.e., did not allow the public to comment on the new guidelines for Title VII, the
guidelines were considered "interpretive." See generally Koch, Public Procedures for the Promul-
gation of Interpretive Rules amid General Statenents of Policy, 64 GFo. L.J. 1047 (1976). The
Court could have accorded the guidelines great weight as long as they were not inconsistent
with congressional intent. See also Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co. Inc., 414 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1973).
The Gilbert Court looked to recent congressional enactments to determine the intent of the sex
discrimination clause in Title VII. 429 U.S. at [43. It then declared that a fir reading of Title
VII would preclude deference to the EEOC gUidelines. ld. at 143-45.
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An analysis of the plurality holding of Gilbert suggests that two
standards have emerged in adjudicating Title VII claims. The general
standard which the Court has followed in race discrimination cases is
the discriminatory effect test. 46 The alternative approach in ad-
judicating some Section 703(a)(1) employment claims is to find evi-
dence of a pretext designed to effectuate invidious discrimination. 7
Despite this dual standard, five justices stated that the discriminatory
effect analysis still was viable in all Title VII adjudications.4 8  Justice
Blackmun stated this point most succinctly when he declared:
I do not join any inference or suggestion in the Court's opinion
... that effect may never be a controlling factor in a Title VII
case, or that Griggs v. Duke Power Co., is no longer good law. 49
Although the EEOC guidelines were considered "interpretive", they suggest a common sense
belief that what affects pregnancy necessarily affects women. As a lower court previously had
stated, "Even if it is thought that the rule [mandatory maternity leave] is neutral on its face,
because only females can become pregnant, the rule's application has a gender-based dis-
criminatory effect." See MacLennan v. American Airlines, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 466, 470 (E.D.
Va. 1977). Why the Supreme Court did not contemplate that this logic was also implied by the
legislative enactment and the EEOC guidelines was not addressed by the Court. But see Gil-
bert, 429 U.S. at 155-56 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
46. See Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
47. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In this case, the
basis of the complaint was that the employee's discharge was racially motivated. The Court
therein reviewed tihe proper order and nature of proof in a pretext analysis for actions under
Section 703(a) (1). Id. at 793-94. The complainant must carry the initial burden to establish a
prima facie case of racial discrimination. Id. at 802. The burden then shifts to the employer "to
articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" fbr the employment practice. Id. The bur-
den of going forward with the evidence shifts again to the aggrieved party so that he or she has
the opportunity to demonstrate that the so-called valid reason for the employment practice was
a pretext designed to effect discrimination. Id. See also Barnes v. Callaghan & Co., 559 F.2d
1102, 1107 (7th Cir. 1977) (employer's reason for terminating the employee served to rebut a
prima facie case of sex discrimination); but see Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251
(5th Cir. 1977). In Turner, the court stated that an employer must present proof of a legitimate
reason for his decision, rather than merely articulating a nondiscriminatory reason, in order to
rebut a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Id. at 1256. It distinguished this case from
McDonnell Douglas v. Creen by noting that the issue there was whether an articulated reason
could rebut the prima facie case of discrimination. 555 F.2d at 1254.
48. Justice Stewart (concurring) stated, "I do not understand the opinion to question... the
significance generally of proving a discriminatory effect in a Title VII case." Gilbert, 429 U.S. at
146 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall concurred, declared
in his dissent: "[A] prima facie violation of Title VII whether under § 703(a) (1) or § 703 (a) (2),
also is established by demonstrating that a facially neutral classification has the effect of dis-
criminating against members of the defined class." Id. at 155 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens stressed that the burden of proof in a cause of action based on a constitutional claim is
heavier than that in proving a statutory prohibition; therefore, the analysis of Geduldig should
not control the statutory interpretation of the Gilbert case. Id. at 160 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
For Justice Blackmun's comments, see note 49 and accompanying text infra.
49. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 146 (Blackman, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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As evidenced by this disagreement between the members of tile
Court, it appeared that after Gilbert, the state of the law in this area
was less than clear. 50
A NEW STANDARD EMERGES FROM NASHVILLE
GAS Co. v. SATTY
Although Gilbert suggests that both the pretext analysis and the
discriminatory effect test are proper standards for evaluating Title VII
claims, the language of the Court in Satty seems to limit the
"either/or" application of these standards. In considering the respon-
dent's claim concerning seniority rights, the analysis of the Supreme
Court incorporated the discriminatory effect test in determining
whether the loss of seniority was in fact a violation of Section 703(a)
(2).51 The Cout found that the denial of accumulated seniority to
those on a leave of absence was a facially neutral company policy. 52
However, it noted that the effect of the policy as it pertained to
pregnancy leave was to deprive those women of "employment oppor-
tunities". Moreover, the Court noted, this policy would "adversely
affect [women's] status as employees." 53  Accordingly, because
50. That there was confosion as to the law is indicated by' recent articles on the Gilbert
decision. See Comment, General Electric v. Gilbert: A Lesson in Sex Education and Discrimina-
tion-The Relationship Between Pregnancy a(d Gender and the Vitality of the Disproportionate
Impact Analysis, 1977 UTAH- L. REv,. 119, 133 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Disproportionate
Impact Analysis] (suggesting that a plurality of the Court is willing to limit Griggs to Section
703(a)(2) actions); Note, General Electric v. Gilbert, Denial of Employpnent Rights Under Title VII,
46 UMKC L. REv. 133, 140 (1977) (suggesting that the practical results of Gilbert may be the
requirement of intent to prove a prima Jaeie ease under Title VII); Recent Cases, 91 1IHARV. L.
REv. 241, 242-43 (1977) (suggesting that Justice Rehnquist hinted that a showing of intent was
necessary, but proceeded in conformity with Title VII to examine the effects of the employment
practice). See also G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 126-27 (9th ed. 1977 Supp.). Professor
Gunther noted that the plurality in Gilbert recognized discriminatory effect as a valid analysis
under Title ViI but at the same time cast doubt on its persuasiveness. Id.
51. 98 S. Ct. at 351. The Court cited to Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 432 (1971) in
support of the application of the discriminatory effect analysis.
52. 98 S. Ct. at 350. The seniority policy applied to both male and female employees who
were returning from a leave of absence. However, this policy had not been applied to any leave
outside the pregnancy context since those employees who had been affected by the leave policy
failed to return to the company. Id. at 350 n.2.
53. Id. at 351. The Court noted that Ms. Satty would have felt the effects of the lower
seniority for the remainder of her career with Nashville Gas Co. Id. The burden Ms. Satty
suffered apparently refers to the long-term effects of the seniority policy. See generally Aaron,
Reflection of the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1532
(1962) (seniority system in American industry is the source of employment opportunities for
those covered by a seniority program).
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens discusses the majority's handling of the benefit-burden
issue. He found the difference between a benefit and a burden illusory, noting that this is not a
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women would feel the effect of this practice for the remainder of their
careers, the Court found the requisite discriminatory effect. 54
In examining the claim concerning the denial of sick leave pay, the
Court used a different and ambiguous standard. It first established
that the sick leave plan in Satty was legally indistinguishable from
that in Gilbert. 55 Therefore, it held that Gilbert should control. 56 It
then stated that Ms., Satty could prove discrimination in violation of
Section 703(a)(1) if she could demonstrate that the Company's prac-
tice was a "[pretext] designed to effect an invidious discrimination
against the members of one sex .... "57
It appears that if the majority had presented the pretext approach
as an alternatice to the discriminatory effect approach, they would
have been in accord with the Gilbert decision.5" However, the Court
prefaced the comment with the statement that "[o]nly if a plaintiff
. . . can demonstrate [a pretext] . .. does Title VII apply."59 The
Court gave no hint to the meaning of "only if". If the Court inter-
prets "only if" to mean that a pretext to effectuate discrimination
must be proven before a violation of Section 703(a)(1) can be found, a
new, judicially developed mandate clearly has been placed on this section
as it applies to pregnant women 60 and potentially as it may apply to all
persons raising claims under this section.
meaningftl test of discrimination since one class is necessarily benefited and the other is always
burdened. 98 S. Ct. at 357-58 n.4.
54. Id. at 351-52.
55. Id. at 353. The Court also noted that both the sick leave plan in Satty and the disability
plan in Gilbert appropriately fell within the scope of Section 703(a)(1). Id.
56. It could be argued that the respondent made a fatal error when she conceded that the
petitioner's sick plan was generally identical to the disability plan examined in Gilbert. On first
glance, the policies may appear similar. However, in Satty, the respondent was deprived of sick
days which she had previously earned as part of the terms of her employment. See note 7 and
accompanying text supra. Once these sick days were expended, whether for a pregnancy related
disability or another illness, the employee would have no more opportunity to use sick leave.
On the other hand, the company policy in Gilbert allowed an employee to draw from the
disability insurance several times during the year, with a limit only UpOnk the number of days for
which disability benefits would be paid for a single illness. 429 U.S. at 128. Thus, in that circumstance,
a pregnant employee may in fact draw a higher benefit than a male employee. However, in the
present case, the maximum number of clays for sick leave was predetermined and was applicable to
both males and females with equal force. Thus, once the earned sick days were exhausted, for any
reason, the employee would have to take leave without pay.
57. 98 S.Ct. at 353.
58. See note 46-47 and accompanying text supra.
59. 98 S.Ct. at 352 (emphasis added).
60. When discussing the proper scope of the remand, the Court stated that the lower court
may consider the company's seniority policy in considering whether the sick leave plan was a
pretext to effectuate discrimination. Id. at 353. This is consistent with the position that the
Supreme Court is adopting a pretext approach fbr Section 703(a)(1) claims.
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As a result of Satty, it appears that the Court has enunciated a new
standard for Section 703(a)(1) controversies. As previously discussed,
Gilbert implied that the pretext approach was an alternative to, rather
than in lieu of, a discriminatory effect analysis. 6 ' Yet, in the more
recent Satty opinion, the Court indicates that the pretext analysis is
the only applicable statutory test. Yet, seemingly as an afterthought,
the Court went on in Satty to mention that the respondent "...
failed to prove even a discriminatory effect .... ."62 The Court,
however, failed to indicate what in fact constituted such an effect.
The only indication offered in this opinion as to what was not a suffi-
cient discriminatory effect was the mere loss of income. 63 Thus, al-
though the Court perhaps has not completely discarded the tradi-
tional discriminatory effect approach to Title VII, it has rendered the
application of the test vague and diluted.
With regard to whether the plaintiff has to prove intent as an ele-
ment of the cause of action in a Section 703(a)(1) violation, the Court
expressly refused to decide the issue. 64 Nevertheless, precedent in-
dicates that the presence of bad intent or lack of good intent is not
dispositive in the determination of whether a discriminatory practice
exists.65 Indeed, the Court previously has noted that Title VII is di-
rected towards the consequences of employment practices, not to the
motivation behind them. 66 Accordingly, one can argue that such prece-
dent applies equally to both Sections 703(a)(1) and 703(a)(2). But, by
looking in Satty for a pretext to effectuate discrimination, the Court in
effect is employing an equal protection analysis, which requires the
rigorous demand of proof of intent. Thus, the Supreme Court, with its
ostensible avoidance of the "intent" issue, has implied its necessity for
proving Section 703(a)(1) claims.
As a consequence, Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty has left the state of
the law in a turmoil. Although this opinion only discussed Section
703(a)(1) in terms of discrimination based on pregnancy, the validity
of a discriminatory effect analysis is highly questionable for other con-
61. See notes 47-49 and accompanying text supra.
62. 98 S.Ct. at 353 (emphasis added).
63. 1d. at 352-53. Notwithstanding this statement, the pregnant employee also loses that
which she has earned by virtue of her service of employment-accumulated sick days-an
integral part of her employment terms. In this regard, she is discriminated against in her com-
pensation and privileges of employment. She has not only been denied a benefit granted others,
but has also been deprived of a benefit she justly earned.
64. Id. at 352.
65. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
66. Albermarle v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422 (1975) (preemployment tests worked dis-
criminatory effect against racial minorities). See also notes 33-37 and accompanying text supra.
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troversies which may arise under this section. 67 Furthermore, any
analysis based on "pretext" seems to require intent, thus destroying
Title VII's emphasis on consequences of rather than motivation be-
hind the employment practices. 68
IMPACT
The ramifications of the Satty decision are indeed profound. Al-
though the Supreme Court has recognized that society cannot im-
permissably discriminate against women, as it cannot impermissably
discriminate against minorities in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause, 69 the Court has declared that the exclusion of pregnant
women from certain benefit packages is not per se impermissable dis-
crimination, under both the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII. 70
The Supreme Court clearly has indicated that pregnant women are
faced with a formidable task in proving deliberate forms of discrimina-
tion. This task, coupled with the chaotic opinion from Satty, indicates
that the Supreme Court is not the ideal arbiter of claims raised by
67. The discriminatory effect analysis is viable for Section 703(a)(2) claims. However, if the
Court has changed the standard to be applied to some Title VII controversies, i.e., Section
703(a)(1) claims, it may generalize that new standard and incorporate it within Section 703(a)(2)
claims. The results would be the demise of the effectiveness of Title VII. For example, if Griggs
v. Duke Power Co. had been scrutinized under the pretext approach, the Court may have found
that the Company's testing policy was not a violation of Title VII if it had found no intent to
discriminate against minority applicants. See Disproportionate Impact Analysis, supra note 50, at
133.
68. Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) and Dothard v. Rawlin-
son, 97 S.Ct. 2720, 2726 (1977) (alleging sex and racial discrimination in employment opportun-
ity) with Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 98 S.Ct. 347, 352 (1977).
69. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). Justice Brennan stated:
it can hardly be doubted that because of the high visibility of the sex charac-
teristic, women still face pervasive, although at times more subtle discrimina-
tion. . . .Moreover, since sex, like race... is an immutable characteristic. . .the
imposition of special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of
their sex violates the concept that burdens bear some relationship to individual
responsibility.
See generally 411 U.S. at 686-88. See also Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975). In that case, a
lower age of majority for females than for males was found to be unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court stated, "No longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of a family,
and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas .. " Id. at 14; Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971) (Idaho's estate statute that gave preference to men over women found un-
constitutional); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (hiring policy for
women different than that for men, each having preschool aged children, found impermissable
under Title VII).
70. Gilbert, 429 U.S.,at 136.
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female workers who happen to be pregnant, unless those practices
clearly affect prospective employment opportunities. 71
Although the coverage of Title VII is somewhat in question, 72 it is
important to note that a viable alternative exists at the state level. To
date, several state legislatures have incorporated within their fair
employment practice statutes the prohibition against discrimination
because of pregnancy. 73 These state legislative bodies implicitly rec-
ognize that employment policies segregating pregnancy or pregnant
women for different treatment are in flct policies of sex discrimina-
tion.
Moreover, at least one state judicial body has provided an alterna-
tive forum beyond Title VII for those alleging sex discrimination be-
71. The lower courts, with unanimity, have declared that exclusion of pregnancy benefits
from certain benefit plans is, indeed, discrimination against women. These same courts have
accorded "great deference" to the EEOC guidelines. See, e.g,, Richmond Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Berg, 528 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated ter curiam 98 S.Ct. 623 (1977) (employee policy
forcing mandatory maternity leave and denial of sick pay a violation of Title VII); Wetzel v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 205 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds 424 U.S. 737
(1976) (pregnancy benefits must be included in income protection plan in accordance with Title
VII); Gilbert v. General Electric Co., 519 F.2d 661, 664, n.12 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated 429 U.S.
125 (1976) (disability plan excluding pregnancy found in violation of Title VII); I lutchinson v.
Lake Oswego Sc. Dist., 519 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1975) (refusal to grant sick leave benefits for
normal pregnancy a violation of Title VII); Holthans v. Compton & Sons, Inc., 514 F.2d 651,
653 (8th Cir. 1975) (disparate impact analysis applicable to any adverse action taken against a
pregnant employee); Communications Workers v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 513 F.2d 1024,
1030 (2d Cir. 1975) (exclusion of pregnancy related disabilities not controlled by Geduldig). See
also Cook v. Arentzen, 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7544 at 4701-702 (4th Cir. 1977). (Gilbert does not
license an employer to fire an employee for the "offense" of becoming pregnant). But see Lewis
v. Los Angeles City Unified Sch. Dist., 429 F. Supp. 935 (C. D. Cal. 1977) (mandatory, involun-
tary, unpaid maternity leave permissible under the Gilbert ruling); Madrid v. Board of Educ. of
Gilroy United Sch. Dist., 429 F. Supp. 816 (N. D. Cal. 1977) (same).
72. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, - U.S.-, 46 U.S.L.W. 4347 (1978). In
Manhart, the higher contribution by female employees than male employees to a retirement
plan was found to be a prima facie violation of Section 703(a)(1). Justice Stevens, in his majority
opinion, distinguished Manhart from Gilbert and consequently Satty by noting that the classifi-
cation of pregnant and non-pregnant persons included a group which was composed of both
sexes. On the other hand, the discriminatory practice in Manhart was directed to only one
group-women. Id. at 4351 & n.29.
Although Manhart may clarify the parameters of sex discrimination in general under Title
VII, it does not provide much assistance to pregnant females raising claims. An alternative
avenue of relief, therefore, may be premised on the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 1877, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 (1970) which collectively prohibit the deprivation of civil rights by
state or private action. Although the acts do not specifically proscribe discrimination in
employment, they can be used to redress such discriminatory actions. See Brooks, Use of Civil
Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 to Redress Employment Discrimination, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 258,
258-60 (1977). See also Reiss, Requiem for an "Independent Remedy": The Civil Rights Act of
1866 and 1871 as Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 961 (1977)
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cause of pregnancy. The New York Court of Appeals has ruled that a
public employment personnel policy, which treated pregnancy and
childbirth differently than it treated other medical disabilities, was
prohibited by a New York statute virtually identical to Title VII. 74
The court noted that the Gilbert decision, although instructive, was
not binding. 75 Should the remaining state judicial bodies follow New
York's lead, female litigants would be wise to raise their claims of
employment discrimination in the state courts. However, for those
states with anti-discrimination statutes nearly identical to Title VII, 76
it should be noted that courts of those respective states may, look to
the determinations of the Supreme Court decisions for guidance.
For the present, those women who are unprotected by state fair
employment practice laws 77 or case law are left to the mercy of lower
courts which attempt to follow the dictates of Gilbert and Satty. 78
This is true, of course, unless Congress overrules Gilbert and Satty
through an amendment to Title VII. Indeed, the Gilbert decision has
already served as a catalyst for such congressional clarification. 79 The
Senate has recently passed a bill which would, in effect, overrule
(plaintiff should allege both §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 claims and Title VII claims to safeguard against
procedural pitfalls of Title VII); But see Note, The Reach of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3): Sex Discrimi-
nation as a Gauge, 25 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 331 (1976) (demonstrates difficulties litigants face in
raising § 1985(3) claim).
73. See Comment, Pregnancy Based Discrimination - General Electric v. Gilbert and Alter-
native State Remedies, 81 DICK. L. REV. 517, 535-37 (1977). Those states which have incorpo-
rated a prohibition against discrimination based on pregnancy include: Maryland (MD. ANN.
CODE art. 49 B § 19 (Cum. Supp. 1976)); Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B § 4
(West Supp. 1976)); New York (N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney Supp. 1976)); Pennsylvania
(PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955 (Purdon Supp. 1976)).
In three states, statutes prohibit discrimination in the denial of sick pay to pregnant
employees. The states are: Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(1) (Supp. 1976)); Connecticut
(CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-126 (West Supp. 1977)); Montana (MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §
41-2602 (Cum. Supp. 1975)).
Since Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made clear that Congress did not intend to
preclude state efforts to bar discrimination, the Gilbert and Satty decisions will have no impact
in these states. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1970).
74. Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 41 N.Y. 2d 84,
359 N.E.2d 393, 390 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Brooklyn Gas v. Appeal Bd.]
(interpreting Human Right8 Law, N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney Supp. 1976)).
75. Brooklyn Gas v. Appeal Bd., 41 N.Y. 2d at 86, n. 1, 359 N.E. 2d 395.
76. See, e.g., Delaware (DEL. CODE, tit. 19, § 711(a) (1974)); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN.,
§ 10.5-3 (1978)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (Baldwin 1971)).
77. See, e.g., Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia. See 3 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) §§ 20,101; 20,723;
21,912; 23,548; 24,701; 26,448; 26,523; 27,898; 28,048; 29,398 respectively (1976).
78. Those women who are unprotected by state statutes can file claims with the EEOC if
applicable. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974). Thus any judicial review would occur
in federal courts.
79. S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.].
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
both decisions. 8 The Senate report accompanying the proposed
legislation declares that the purpose of the amendment is to make
plain that discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth and other
related medical conditions is indeed discrimination based on sex.81
The Senate intends for the bill to insure that working women are
protected against all forms of employment discrimination based on
sex. 82 , The report also reiterates the general congressional intent of
the 1972 amendments to Title VII: discrimination against women is to
be granted the same degree of social concern given to any type of
unlawful discrimination. 83  Furthermore, the Senate stated that the
EEOC properly implemented the c6ngressional intent when it prom-
ulgated guidelines later ignored by the Supreme Court. 84
Although the Senate report can only assume what previous mem-
bers of Congress intended, it nevertheless serves as a more plausible
interpretation, certainly one deserving more credence than the in-
terpretation proferred by the Supreme Court. Significantly, Congress,
the direct representative of the people, has expressed its complete
dissatisfaction with the Court's treatment of the pregnancy issue. 85 Of
course, the ultimate resolution in this area of the law must await pas-
sage of the Senate bill by the House of Representatives. 86 Only then
will women in all fifty states be protected against all forms of dis-
crimination based on pregnancy and on sex. With passage of the Sen-
ate amendment to Title VII, the Gilbert and Satty decisions are now
placed in the annals of history.
Janet K. De Costa
80. S. 995, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as S. 995]. The committee
adopted Justice Brennan's and Justice Stevens' dissents in Gilbert and stated, ". . .S. 995 was
introduced to change the definition of sex discrimination in Title VII to reflect the common-
sense view. ... S. REP. No. 331 at 3. In so doing, the committee noted that the two dissent-
ing opinions correctly "expressed the principle and meaning of Title VII." Id. at 2. S. 995, in
pertinent part, is as follows:
The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not limited to,
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions;
and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions shall be
treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits
under fringe benefit programs ..
Id.
81. S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2, citing H. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971).
84. S. REP. No. 331 at 2.
85. While this Note was being prepared for printing, the President signed S. 995 into law.
Accordingly, the law now overrules the results in both Gilbert and Satty but does not disturb
the legal analysis proferred by the Court.
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